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Abstract
This article argues that neorealist theory can be properly maintained against a neoidealist critique that 
stresses the moral impact of the ‘foreign aid regime’. Neoidealists have attacked neorealism, claiming that 
aid is best explained by considerations of humanity and distributive justice, rather than strategic and 
economic interests of donor states, and thereby embodies (the potential for) moral transformation of the 
international system. A threefold argument is to show that the neoidealist attack on neorealism only has 
limited success. First, the neoidealist argument of moral factors being foundational to aid may be more 
convincing than a standard neorealist argument of security-related factors being the main direct causes, 
but neorealism is not automatically silenced by this. Second, as basically a ‘second image’ explanation, 
neoidealism overlooks a progressive/conservative discontinuity in the morality behind aid that reveals 
neoidealism’s overall internal incoherence. Third, the typically conservative character of the aid regime can 
be properly explained by ‘third image’ neorealist propositions about states as primarily egoistic security-
seekers under anarchy. While neoidealism clarifies the implausibility of an extreme neorealism that 
assumes states to maximize their security and also to use aid directly for this purpose, it is wrong 
to regard itself as superior to neorealism per se. Rather, the aid regime suggests the plausibility of a 
‘mixed neorealist’ theory that assigns clear priority to national security but also expects states, if once 
secure, to show altruistic behavior depending on the nature and development of their domestic 
moral-political systems. 




This article argues that neorealism - arguably the dominant theory of international politics - can be properly 
maintained against a recent neoidealist critique that emphasizes the moral impact of the ‘foreign aid 
regime': the more than fifty-year old international practice of overseas development assistance. Aid given 
by rich states to poor ones constitutes an enduring feature of North-South relations and a financial transfer 
of more than 2 trillion U.S. dollars to date (Lumsdaine 1993: 4; Noël and Thérien 1995: 552; Thérien 2002: 
449). Yet prominent neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz (1979) and John Mearsheimer 
(2001) have been virtually silent about it. Theoretically, neorealism is attacked by neoidealists who believe 
that the very existence of a ‘foreign aid regime' proves neorealism's untenability: the underlying ‘moral 
vision' based on values such as ‘humanity' and ‘justice' has transformative potential (Lumsdaine 1993; Noël 
and Thérien 1995; 2002; Thérien and Noël 2000). Neoidealists claim that aid is not based on strategic and 
economic donor interests, but constitutes ‘a significant revision of the international system on the basis of 
the recognition of a moral obligation to the weak' (Lumsdaine 1993: 290), and ‘has contributed 
substantially to the transformation of contemporary world politics' (Thérien 2002: 449). However, as I 
intend to show, while altruistic impulses may be the sine qua non of aid, neorealism can be upheld against 
the neoidealist critique; neorealism can even absorb this critique by reforming itself toward a morally more 
positive theory without giving up its core insights. Aid does not help transform the dangerous anarchical 
international system, yet seems a largely independent moral force that might make the system more 
bearable (cf. Waltz 2000: 5, 39). 
Neorealism I take to rest on four core propositions (Waltz 1979). First, the international political system is 
permanently constituted by anarchy. In the absence of world government, the international realm is 
invariably anarchic, while it does allow the international system to vary in the way in which capabilities are 
distributed across units. Second, states are the main units of the international system. Third, seeking to 
ensure their survival under anarchy, states have security as their primary goal, only pursuing the other 
goals they may have once security is assured. Fourth, seeking to ensure their survival, states are primarily 
egoistic or ‘self-regarding', with concern for others as secondary at best. Taken together, these 
propositions have a crucial implication for political morality: ‘Moral behavior is one thing in a system that 
provides predictable amounts and types of security; another thing where such security is lacking' (Waltz 
1959: 207, cf. 1986: 344). Thus, I take neorealism not in an extreme formulation that assumes states to 
try maximize their security, but in a more moderate, ‘reasonable' formulation that assigns clear priority to 
national security (Glaser 2003: 412; cf. Mercer 1995: 231). While it does not deny moral motivations in 
individuals and political elites and is not ‘structurally determinist' (Waltz 1979: 174; contra Murray 1997: 
4-9), neorealism holds international politics to be distinctive in the sense that anarchy produces ‘like units'
whose own security interests generally come first. Yet, while it is not skeptical about international morality
- altruistic behavior, albeit constrained, is possible in international politics (cf. Waltz 1993: 55; Glaser
2003; Desch 2003) - neorealism is skeptical about a universalist application of principles of distributive
justice (as advocated by cosmopolitans such as Beitz 1999): such principles might exist domestically, but
they cannot be pursued globally for being dashed against the struggle for the power to survive as an
inescapable outcome of anarchy (Kamminga 2006).
Neoidealism may be seen as a ‘liberal-constructivist' position, one that regards foreign aid as an 
embodiment of moral vision with the potential to transform international politics. Thus, David Lumsdaine 
claims aid to rest on ‘humanitarian and egalitarian convictions', a ‘sense of justice and compassion', and 
the ‘extension of [the moral logic of the welfare state] beyond national borders' on the basis of ‘the same 
values' (Lumsdaine 1993: 29, 283, 185, 143; cf. Amstutz 2005: 16, 36, 209). Alain Noël and Jean-Philippe 
Thérien conceive aid as a movement ‘from domestic to international justice' based on the ‘relation of 
complementarity' between the institutions that promote these forms of ‘justice' (Noël and Thérien 1995: 
article title, 551), with ‘global justice' (Noël and Thérien 2002), or ‘greater international equality' (Thérien 
2002: 450, cf. 452-453), as the ultimate underlying motive. Gunnar Myrdal regards aid as the logical 
product of the ‘doctrine of equality' (Myrdal 1973: 47). While acknowledging that aid motives are normally 
mixed, neoidealists insist that moral factors have been decisive in the long run: for the origin, 
sustainability, and development of aid as a regime. Neoidealists claim the validity of their position to 
extend beyond foreign aid as a ‘paradigm case' (Lumsdaine 1993: 29, cf. 4): ‘[m]oral factors can alter the 
tenor of international life, not only in peripheral ways, but by changing the character of the system' (ibid.: 
29). 
A threefold argument is to show that the neoidealist attack on neorealism only has limited success. I start 
by demonstrating neoidealism's initial plausibility (first argument), next I offer an internal critique of 
neoidealism (second argument), and then I show the analytic contribution of the four neorealist core 
propositions, thus providing an external critique of neoidealism (third argument). Thus, first, the 
neoidealist argument of moral factors being foundational to aid may be more convincing than a standard 
neorealist argument of security-related factors being the main direct causes, but neorealism is not 
automatically silenced by this. Second, as basically a ‘second image' explanation, neoidealism overlooks a 
progressive/conservative discontinuity in the morality behind aid that reveals neoidealism's overall internal 
incoherence. Third, the typically conservative character of the aid regime can be properly explained by 
‘third image' neorealist propositions about states as primarily egoistic security-seekers under anarchy. 
While neoidealism clarifies the implausibility of an extreme neorealism that assumes states to maximize 
their security and also to use aid directly for this purpose, it is wrong to regard itself as superior to 
neorealism per se. Rather, the aid regime suggests the plausibility of a ‘mixed neorealist' theory that 
assigns clear priority to national security but also expects states, if once secure, to show altruistic behavior 
depending on the nature and development of their domestic moral-political systems. If successful, foreign 
aid may help change the international system, not basically - in overstating the transformative impact of 
moral factors, neoidealism offers insufficient reason for abandoning neorealim's core propositions - yet in 
meaningfully peripheral ways.[1] 
Neoidealism and the role of moral factors 
As I shall demonstrate, the neoidealist claim that moral factors are basic to aid is sufficiently plausible for 
reconsidering, if not abandoning, any inclination to regard strategic or economic interests as the main 
immediate aid causes. Yet I shall also show why neorealism need not admit defeat, at least not right away. 
Traditionally, scholars have argued that countries provide aid primarily for non-altruistic reasons: strategic, 
political, ideological, economic, colonial, historical, and cultural (cf. Alesina and Dollar 2000; Breuning 
1995; Schraeder et al. 1998). Thus, U.S. aid has been explained by pointing to strategic interests related 
to the Cold War and the recent ‘war on terror', with economic (notably trade) interests second especially 
during the 1990s. Japanese aid has been attributed to economic self-interest and now increasingly to its 
security aims. European aid has been claimed to exist because of donor interests in special ties with former 
colonies (Schraeder et al. 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Lai 2003; Woods 2005: 401, 403; Raffer and 
Singer 2001: chs. 5-6; Olsen 1998). If all this were correct, neorealism could plausibly explain a large 
portion, if not most, of aid directly. 
However, the rival neoidealist argument that foreign aid is not mainly caused by donor self-interests, but is 
an embodiment of moral vision with transformative potential, I would argue, has a particular, fourfold 
strength (cf. Kamminga 2004: 540-545). First, to support their position neoidealists use a systematic and 
broad analysis of extensive qualitative and quantitative evidence that goes beyond the case-by-case 
analyses often employed by aid scholars who emphasize egoistic factors, and also focuses on the 
emergence of aid, similarities and differences between donors' policies, aid proponents and opponents, the 
impact of domestic beliefs, historical antecedents, the most important aid recipients, and the developments 
within the aid regime. Second, certain general features of the aid regime, which suggest that aid has been 
directed primarily at the economic development of the poorest countries and increasingly less at direct 
donor advantage, seem hard to explain without invoking moral factors.[2] Thus, neoidealists can clarify 
why aid appeared suddenly and rapidly, the poverty focus of aid grew over time, tied aid steadily declined, 
and the gifts-loans ratio steadily increased into the twenty-first century (Lumsdaine 1993; Hattori 2003: 
242-243).[3]
Third, neoidealism makes plausible why U.S., Japanese, and European aid can only be adequately 
explained if moral factors are included. Fear of communism did influence U.S. aid: the United States 
contributed most vigorously to the regime in the early 1960s when the Cold War was intense (Lumsdaine 
1993: 241-242, 286, 133; Thérien 2002: 454). However, U.S. aid originates with left-wing New Dealers 
and Wilsonian internationalists, and has consistently been supported by liberal Democrats and opposed by 
right-wing Republicans (Lumsdaine 1993: 56, 219, 227; cf. Thérien 2002: 452-453). Although U.S. aid 
declined since the late 1960s and further after the Cold War, no quick drop of its level occurred (Lumsdaine 
1993: 110). And while about one-third of U.S. aid goes to politically and strategically important countries 
such as Israel and Egypt, the rest is mainly directed at poor countries because of recipient need (ibid.: 82, 
90-93, 102; Alesina and Dollar 2000). The mix of humanitarian and strategic concerns Lumsdaine (1993:
42, 255, 286) detects behind U.S. aid clarifies U.S. aid behavior both during the Cold War and shortly after
(Meernik et al. 1998; Lai 2003), and also the U.S. aid increase after '11 September' (Radelet 2003; Woods
2005: 397-400). Humanitarianism is more clearly present in U.S. than in Japanese aid, since the
mid-1990s particularly in the aim of poverty reduction (Lumsdaine 1993: 88-93; Alesina and Dollar 2000;
Tuman et al. 2001). Yet Japanese aid, too, has been motivated by a mixed humanitarian-security rationale:
particularly Japanese aid to Latin America has rested on both economic interests and separate poverty
reduction goals (Tuman et al. 2001). European aid does not endure because of donor interests in special
ties with ex-colonies, being (even) more morally motivated than U.S. and Japanese aid. European
aid to ex-colonies has consistently declined from the beginning, having gone more and more to low-income 
countries. Insofar aid to ex-colonies was continued, as with Dutch aid to Indonesia and most of British aid - 
with India as largest recipient -, it usually concerned low income countries with large populations 
(Lumsdaine 1993: 82-85, 107-109).[4] Moreover, a left-wing motive of ‘justice' entailing an independent 
commitment to poverty reduction and recipient economic development (ibid.: 99, 102) has marked 
European aid since the 1960s, having become most typical of Nordic and Dutch aid. This motive has even 
become crucial for the entire aid regime: the U.S. share has consistently decreased since the late 1960s 
(from a quarter to one-fifth to one-sixth, albeit rising again to a quarter since 2002; Woods 2005: 397), 
and the European Union (EU) has become the world's largest donor, providing more than half of total aid 
today - twice as much as the United States (cf. United Nations 2007: 153). 
Fourth, neoidealists persuasively stress the role of the post-war welfare state ethics - a main point that 
‘traditional' aid scholars have tended to ignore. Thus, a direct aid motive is that concern for poor citizens 
through social spending in one's own, rich country should go together with material attention to foreigners 
even worse off; the poor abroad should benefit from one's welfare, too. Neoidealists have realized, 
however, that this general moral motive needs specification, if only because welfare states differ 
significantly in their concern for the poor. Thus, further inquiry by Noël and Thérien (1995) shows that 
profound aid commitment follows not so much from welfare state institutions per se but from particular 
institutional arrangements: ‘socialist' attributes, or the social capacity based on a shared conception of 
citizenship to accept egalitarian, non-market principles of income distribution as positive and feasible, and 
to institutionalize these in high spending for redistribution. Drawing on extensive statistical research, these 
authors conclude that a single, all-determining variable is involved: ‘the more welfare states have socialist 
attributes, the more generous are their development assistance policies', whatever the extent to which 
welfare states also have ‘conservative' or ‘liberal' features (ibid.: 540).[5] The crucial socialist attributes 
are also shaped by the cumulative power of social democratic political parties that exercise an indirect and 
long-term upward effect on the aid level (Thérien and Noël 2000; cf. Lumsdaine 1993: 161). ‘Such findings 
provide solid empirical support for the idea that the welfare state and the aid regime are based on a 
common left-wing ethic' (Thérien 2002: 453). 
Importantly, neoidealism contributes to explaining the divergence of aid levels. Thus, it clarifies why 
Norway (0.93% of GNP in 2005; United Nations 2007: 153), Sweden (0.92%), Denmark (0.81%) and the 
Netherlands (0.82%) are relatively large donors - their welfare states can be called ‘high-socialist';[6] why 
countries such as the United Kingdom (0.48%), France (0.47%), and Germany (0.35%) occupy an 
intermediate donor position - their welfare states can be seen as ‘mid-socialist'; and why Japan (0.28%) 
and the United States (0.22%) relatively give little aid - their welfare states appear respectively ‘low-
socialist' and ‘non-socialist' (Noël and Thérien 1995: 542-545; cf. Thérien and Noël 2000: 158-159; 
Lumsdaine 1993: 121; Esping-Andersen 1990: 74).[7] On a world regional level, it clarifies why the EU is a 
large donor and the United States gives (relatively) little. In Western Europe, much trust has long existed 
in collective action to eliminate class differences. The impact of labor movements and Christian social 
traditions has often been an ethos of social justice directed at equal provisions (cf. Judt 2005: 97). Europe 
features a ‘socialism' anchored deeply in its cultural base, which has resulted in ‘high-socialist' and ‘mid-
socialist' welfare states and relatively high aid levels (cf. Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). By contrast, the 
United States, where socialism has hardly gained any footing and income inequality has always been high, 
puts with its ‘liberal' welfare state all its faith in the operation of the market. It attaches no positive 
significance to organized solidarity and belief in social makability, but features an individualist ethos of self-
help and competitiveness that takes large social inequalities for granted. This set of ideas seems in tension 
with generous foreign aid provision: if one has little trust in governmental care for the poor in one's own 
country, then one will also see little reason for aiding the poor abroad (cf. Lumsdaine 1993: 286). Noël and 
Thérien (2002) have further strengthened the ‘Left matters' thesis by demonstrating the supporting role of 
public opinion: mass publics in Europe basically consists of coherent cosmopolitan egalitarians who aim to 
have distributive justice established first domestically and then globally. When equality has been 
institutionalized as an important principle, the public acknowledges the results and supports international 
redistribution. On the whole, European citizens are not nationalists who advocate giving priority to 
compatriots, but regard starting at home as simply the only sensible way to do good.[8] 
In short, serious reason exists for taking the neoidealist argument of moral factors being the main direct 
causes of aid as more illuminating than a neorealist one that points to the immediacy of strategic or 
economic factors. It would otherwise be hard to fully understand why rich countries decided after World 
War II to offer aid to poor ones and have continued to do so, why donors' aid levels differ remarkably, and 
why donors have sought to improve the effectiveness of aid as a means of poverty reduction (cf. Riddell 
1987; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 890; Woods 2005: 408). Factors of humanity and especially socialist 
justice seem essential for aid as a long-term project in all its motive and level variety. Plausibly, since the 
aid practice reached maturity in the 1960s and 1970s, ‘the values and principles embodied in social 
democratic institutions created at the domestic level had a clear impact on the foreign aid regime' (Noël 
and Thérien 1995: 551). 
Even so, neorealists are not, or not yet, forced to admit that their theory has nothing to say about foreign 
aid and the transformative potential of the moral factors sustaining it. First, it does not follow from its 
propositions that neorealism is bound to explain aid as directly and primarily cased by strategic importance 
or economic potential (contra Schraeder et al. 1998: 298, 303, cf. 299; Lumsdaine 1993). Neorealism may 
take the aid causes, even if morality-related, to lie in individual states as well as in the international 
system (cf. Waltz 1979: 48-49, 78, 87; 1986: 328, 343; Buzan et al. 1993: 23, 83), although, of course, it 
itself must specifically aim to explain how external forces shape states' behavior in this regard (cf. Waltz 
1979: 71-72, 121-123; 2004: 3-4; 1959). Lumsdaine (1993: 14-21, 28-29), then, is wrong to see 
Waltzian neorealism as structurally determinist and skeptical about international morality. Second, at this 
point it is unclear whether indeed the foreign aid regime may entail morally fundamental system change. 
Thus, further inquiry is needed to establish whether neoidealism succeeds as an attack on the neorealist 
framework. 
Progressive/conservative discontinuity: against neoidealism I 
Although neoidealists include the moral influence of international public opinion, international organization, 
and international interaction between states and citizens (Lumsdaine 1993), they claim that they basically 
provide a ‘second image' (Noël and Thérien 1995: 525; Thérien 2002; cf. Lumsdaine 1993: 28-29) 
explanation of foreign aid. I now argue that as such the neoidealist attack on neorealism is hard to 
maintain on its own grounds. Neoidealism appears to miss a crucial discontinuity in the morality behind aid 
- a progressive/conservative one - which undermines its coherence as a transformative doctrine.
As we have seen, neoidealists claim that the Western welfare state and the aid regime embody ‘the same 
values', thereby emphasizing the presence of ‘a common left-wing ethic' of ‘equality'. However, what 
should bother them about aid simply being the international moral extension of the domestic welfare state 
is one striking difference between both: in a world of great welfare inequalities, the outward transfers 
through aid of all Western states, including the European ones, are only a small fraction of their internal 
transfers between rich and poor (Brown 2002: 1; but cf. Noël and Thérien 1995: 525). Even the 
international efforts of the relatively generous donors - the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway - 
are minimal, if we relate them to their expensive domestic social systems. It might be that this gap reveals 
the presence of a double morality: perhaps not so much in the case of the United States and Japan as 
relatively small aid donors, but at least so in the case of the relatively large European donors. I now try to 
show that the aid regime morality does differ deeply and qualitatively from the European socialist welfare 
state morality - and thus that foreign aid is not just a ‘less stronger' version of the European commitment 
to distributive justice than that at home (contra especially Noël and Thérien 2002) - starting by recalling 
some basic yet crucial features of socialism, the main doctrinal impulse for aid as neoidealism itself so 
plausibly argues (cf. Kamminga 2004: 546-548). 
Socialism advocates an egalitarian society in which the capitalist ‘order' of a privileged economic elite 
exploiting the great majority has given way to a solidary, cooperative order. It should not be understood 
as merely a protest against the misery that accompanied the Industrial Revolution: equality, not poverty, 
is the issue (Davis 1994; cf. Lichtheim 1970). Karl Marx, the intellectual father of communism and social 
democracy, saw the scope of the egalitarian society as global, not national. Capitalism had broken national 
boundaries, and had brought humanity within a single stream of world history, in which economic and 
technological unification for the time being went along with lack of solidarity between capitalists and 
workers as two classes condemned to each other. Workers shared no fatherland, but, given their universal 
deprivation, had a common interest in establishing socialism. Their primary loyalty belonged to their class, 
which represented the whole of humanity; their organizations were involved in a cosmopolitan political 
project. Through revolutionary struggle, socialism would soon replace capitalism, eliminate exploitation and 
domination, and bring real freedom to all (Marx and Engels 1848; cf. Boucher 1998: 354-374; Linklater 
2005). However, since the early twentieth century, a strong bond has existed between socialism and the 
nation-state (Ludz 1977; Kusin 1977). As Marx' expectation of the capitalist collapse at the end of the 
nineteenth century proved wrong, socialists felt it necessary to control the market and protect workers 
through government intervention, and thus to adapt their theory to ‘the facts'. Real politics became a 
national affair about electoral and social struggle for government and policy. Whereas the Marxist had 
emphasized global solidarity above national independence, the ‘revisionist' accepted the state as the 
embodiment of national unity and the instrument for progress of the proletariat. Despite their belief in 
socialist states as reasonable and peace-loving and thus in the service of humanity, the revisionists 
effectively gave up cosmopolitanism (Waltz 1959: 124-158). In Western Europe, workers have eventually 
acquired a high level of equality (concerning educational opportunities, working conditions, and welfare 
levels) mostly because of the pressure from socialist ideas and movements (Kolakowski 1977: 16), but 
elsewhere this value has stayed out of reach for the poor. In fact, capitalism has only become more global 
and global inequality has only increased (Raffer and Singer 2001). Yet Marx' cosmopolitanism apparently 
lives on in contemporary European mass publics, which explicitly indicates that ‘international redistribution 
is important' (Noël and Thérien 2002: 641-645). 
Now in the absence of global proletarian revolution, can foreign aid (if effective) be explained as an 
instrument for promoting global equality (Thérien 2002: 462)? To maintain its coherence as a 
transformative doctrine, neoidealism would need a positive answer to this question. However, the answer is 
no: aid presupposes and sustains inequality. As Tomohisa Hattori (2003) points out, as a moral practice 
foreign aid should, first and foremost, be conceived as an unreciprocated gift - as a voluntary gesture, a 
gift in the form of grants and concessional loans, which legitimizes the existing material North-South order 
in terms of social distinction and desert. By the action of accepting the gift (without being able to return the 
gesture), recipient countries acknowledge not just the material hierarchy but also the moral virtuousness of 
the donors, so that between donor and recipient a moral hierarchy arises. In this way, the aid practice of 
‘beneficence' helps to legitimize the dominant role of donor states as a morally justified desert. It is this 
effect of affirming the status quo that reveals what aid is primarily about, much more so than the 
substantive content and aim of aid projects and programmes (ibid.: 232-234, 237, 243-246). To put 
Hattori's point differently: the aid practice aims to create a (second) welfare ‘state', though a conservative 
(cf. Esping-Andersen 1990; Kamminga 2004: 548-549) one. Aid implies that Western states rightly derive 
a prominent international position from their economic welfare and power, which, though, carries with it 
the social responsibility to provide care to the poorest countries that, as historically grown associations, 
have the primary responsibility for their own citizens. Hence donor states and international organizations 
involved transfer resources not directly to (poor) individuals, but to the governments of the states of which 
they are citizens. While the conservative aid ethics already differs from U.S. and Japanese liberal welfare 
ethics, it is a far cry from the ethics of egalitarian distribution found in European welfare states and the 
cosmopolitan egalitarianism of European mass publics: a progressive domestic morality of 
‘distributive justice' turns into a conservative international one of ‘beneficence'. 
Neoidealism, then, goes seriously wrong insofar as it confuses ‘foreign aid' with ‘international redistribution' 
for the sake of ‘global equality' (cf. Hattori 2003: 245; contra especially Noël and Thérien 1995; 2002; 
Thérien and Noël 2000). If socialist Europe did strive for global redistribution on the basis of the same 
value of equality as it upholds domestically, it would by no means support an aid regime (let alone take 
over the lead position from the United States), but make a strong and potentially successful effort to 
establish something quite different and much more demanding: a global social democratic (thus not 
conservative) welfare state. In socialist economist Myrdal's terms, Europe would develop power to 
transform the ‘protectionist and [economically] nationalist' European welfare state into a ‘Welfare World' 
(Myrdal 1960: 159, 176), which would radically redistribute the world's wealth towards a more equitable 
distribution among individuals (cf. Bull 202: 81, 279-280), establishing, say, a global basic income (Van 
Parijs 1995: 223-228). Or there would be a persistent European attempt to establish a full-blown 
development cooperation regime, which would presumably include cosmopolitanism-based fair tax, 
financial, trade, agricultural, and/or climate regimes (cf. Beitz 1999: 216; Barry 1991). It would be 
implausible for a neoidealist either to insist that the aid regime is somehow related to global social 
democratic welfarism or to switch to the alternative position that strong attempts to implement more 
radical proposals or regimes actually exist (cf. Arts and Dickson 2004).[9] 
In short, neoidealism runs into deep problems of coherency, as it fails to grasp one major moral 
discontinuity of aid: domestic progressivism bleeds into international conservatism. Aid may well be fueled 
by left-wing or socialist ideas, but it breaks away from the equality value itself and thus does not fit within 
an originally socialist worldview. Neoidealists may insist that even a conservative aid ethics proves the 
independent contribution of morality to international politics - one neorealism could not have foreseen. 
Even so, we need to know why international morality appears to take on a conservative appearance. And to 
know why aid exists instead of some more ambitious international moral practice - second image 
neoidealism cannot help us here - we must turn to a separately international, third image analysis. As a 
deep gap between domestic and international morality is no surprise for neorealism, serious reason exists 
to investigate if it might explain this gap.[10] 
Neorealism and foreign aid conservatism: against neoidealism II 
Having criticized the neoidealist attack on neorealism on its own grounds, we may now try to bring 
neorealism back in. My third argument is that the typically conservative character of the foreign aid regime 
can be properly explained by our four neorealist propositions about states as primarily egoistic security-
seekers under anarchy. The argument proceeds by showing the analytic contribution of each of these 
propositions. 
Taken together, the first and second neorealist propositions - states are the main units in an anarchic 
international system that does allow the system to vary as regards the capabilities distribution - already 
help to explain the aid regime. As neorealism would expect, aid presupposes, rather than challenges, the 
primacy of anarchy and states. A cosmopolitan socialist project would be ‘inherently revolutionary' (Bull 
2002: 84-85, 280), and presumably require some centralized apparatus to redistribute resources from rich 
people and more capable states to poor people elsewhere for the sake of interpersonal egalitarianism (cf. 
Hattori 2003: 245). However, in the absence of a world government that could establish the required global 
shift in power, a neoidealist global redistributive regime does not, and cannot, exist. Even together, 
European states lack the power to implement such a regime, if only because the non-socialist United States 
possesses the great capability to prevent it. What do exist are states whose practical disappearance even 
socialism has long given up (Waltz 1959: 142-143), and that have the power to choose to what extent they 
will assist other states in their economic development. That there is merely an aid regime is in line with this 
basic neorealist outlook. A bit too strongly put: foreign aid occurs because there is nothing to enforce global 
distributive justice. 
The third neorealist proposition was that states, in seeking to ensure their survival under anarchy, have 
security as their primary goal, only pursuing their other goals once security is guaranteed. This proposition 
helps to explain the aid regime in several ways. First, total Western expenditure on aid remains much less 
than total Western expenditure on defense. For example, when in 2002 official aid increased to 58 billion 
U.S. dollars, it remained more than ten times smaller than the sum of defense expenditure by high-income 
countries, which was about 600 billion (Soubbotina 2004: 99-100). Second, the aid regime arose and 
matured in an age in which the security of the states that provide aid was no (longer) a serious concern, 
and it seems plausible to assume that security is a main precondition for aid. During both the Cold War and 
the age of terrorism, the United States, which has the world's largest defense budget, ‘has [had] few 
serious reasons to worry much about its security' (Waltz 2004: 5, cf. 1993: 73); the same holds for Japan 
and Europe as ‘consumers' of American security (cf. Mearsheimer 2001: 382). As a neorealist would 
expect, it is the security imperative being met that allows the United States and Japan to export at least 
partially their individualist political cultures and give aid for the purpose of humanity (cf. Meernik et al. 
1998; Lai 2003); and as from World War II to this day Western Europe has enjoyed American protection 
(Waltz 2004: 5), the same is true for the European socialist-motivated project of providing aid in relatively 
large amounts. Third, in elaboration of the former points and in combination with the first two neorealist 
propositions, European aid confirms the neorealist view that one should focus not on small powers, which is 
what neoidealists tend to do, but on the great ones that determine the structure of the international system 
(Waltz 1979: 72-73, cf. 94, 151; 1995: 74; Mearsheimer 2001). From the bipolar international system time 
onward, the United States as a great power has spent enormous financial resources to provide for its own 
security and that of its smaller allies. As Waltz explains, this made possible the development of small-power 
Europe into a somewhat distinct political realm: 
Consider…the effects on European states of the shift from a multipolar to a bipolar system. So long as 
European states were the world's great powers, unity among them could only be dreamed of…The 
emergence of the Russian and American superpowers created a situation that permitted wider ranging and 
more effective cooperation among the states of Western Europe. They became consumers of security…For 
the first time in modern history, the determinants of war and peace lay outside the arena of European 
states, and the means of their preservation were provided by others. These new circumstances made 
possible the famous ‘upgrading of the common interest'… Because the security of [European states] came to 
depend ultimately on the policies of others…unity could effectively be worked for (Waltz 1979: 70-71, 
emphases mine). 
What is to be learned from Waltz's account? Simon Collard-Wexler (2006: especially 417), who argues that 
neorealism does a poor job in explaining the breadth and depth of European integration and the formation 
of the EU as manifesting forms of mixed hierarchy and functional differentiation, seems to miss the point: 
Waltz explains post-war Europe in terms of ‘permissive' rather than ‘immediate' causes (cf. Waltz 1959). In 
contrast to what Collard-Wexler (2006: 418, 423) asserts, neorealism can consistently acknowledge that 
American hegemony is no immediate cause of European integration, that the dynamics of cooperation seen 
in Western Europe failed to occur in East Asia among the ASEAN nations who also came under a U.S. 
security umbrella and faced a communist threat, and even that Mearsheimer (1990) was inaccurate to 
predict a period of great instability in Europe after the Cold War. Waltz's more modest yet forceful point - 
ignored by Collard-Wexler - is that American hegemony has been necessary for European unification as the 
desired institutionalization of a specifically European identity to become possible, and thus is its permissive 
cause (cf. for an historical account Lundestad 2005: 27-110). Likewise, neorealism, while by no means 
bound to an explanation of European (and Japanese) aid as immediately caused by U.S. hegemonic 
influence (contra Lumsdaine 1993: 53-54, 111-112), may consistently, and plausibly, argue that American 
hegemony has made European aid possible by creating the required security conditions, and thus is the 
permissive cause of socialism-driven European aid.[11] One strong neorealist contribution to explaining aid, 
then, is that the aid policies of the ‘effectively semi-sovereign states' of Europe (Mearsheimer 2001: 382) 
became possible from the historical moment the United States took away their primary security concerns by 
carrying many of their burdens and giving them the freedom to erect a grand social democratic system (cf. 
Waltz 1993: 77). Neoidealists tend to ignore that states can only be generous with aid after their basic 
security is taken care of. That European socialist welfarism and foreign aid can exist is not just because of 
the importance the Nordics, the Netherlands, and other European states attach to them; it is also because 
of the hegemonic role of the United States.[12]
The fourth neorealist proposition was that, seeking to guarantee their survival, states are primarily egoistic. 
As neorealism thus assumes an upper limit to international altruistic behavior, the question is whether aid in 
any reasonable interpretation (as a gift) does not exceed this limit. As regards the United States and Japan, 
it would not be sufficient to point out that, while both have individualist political cultures and lack socialist 
welfare states, their commitment to the provision of aid for the needy abroad has been even less than their 
commitment to social spending for the needy at home. However unlikely it actually seems, these liberal 
countries might decide one day to meet the internationally agreed 0.7 percent of GNP aid target, or even to 
move beyond it. Yet the neorealist proposition of state egoism would hold even then: it seems implausible 
to suggest of the United States and Japan that to make, say, 1 or 2 percent of their GNPs available for aid 
would endanger their own survival. 
More significantly, the neorealist state egoism proposition helps to explain the imperfection of European's 
socialism-based commitment to the poor elsewhere, even if its aid levels would increase to, say, 3 or 4 
percent of GNP. Again, the socialist revisionists of the early twentieth century concluded that in practice 
socialism must start as a national phenomenon: it would have to be established within one or more nation-
states first. Governments would have to ensure national survival before they could promote international 
peace by exporting socialism to other parts of the world. However, this strategy did not work; in Waltz's 
(1959) plausible explanation, the socialist aspirations broke down on the egoistic struggle for survival and 
power as an inevitable consequence of international anarchy. Since then, the international system has 
worked in such a way that the European level of welfare provision can only be made available to non-
Europeans in a very incomplete way. Exporting its social democratic welfare state to the world would be 
incompatible with serving European economic security interests, even endangering the survival of 
European states. Countries such as the Nordics and the Netherlands try hard to create distributive justice 
within their own borders, but - particularly within an inegalitarian capitalist world economy - the resulting 
(and still significant) measure of internal equality is inevitably accompanied by the maintenance of great 
inequality between their citizens and the rest of the world. A global extension of their social democratic 
welfare states would destroy the degree of internal distributive justice these states have struggled to 
achieve (cf. Brown 2002: 181-183; Kamminga 2004: 549), and erode the economic base of state survival. 
What neorealism clarifies and neoidealism cannot comprehend is that a generous and increasingly truly 
poverty-oriented aid policy could have been the only viable way for Europe to internationally extend its 
welfare socialism, at the price of egoistically breaking the cosmopolitan ideal of socialist solidarity still alive 
today. 
Our four neorealist propositions, taken together, offer a plausible explanation of the typically conservative 
nature of the aid regime. Neoidealism may rightly indicate the forces of moral action in international 
politics (humanity, distributive justice), but it is neorealist theory that is able to explain their results 
(beneficence). Overall, aid is in line with the neorealist ‘like units' expectation: European states, the 
Nordics and the Netherlands as aid ‘forerunners' not in the last place, are just as security-seeking and self-
regarding as the United States and Japan as aid ‘laggards'. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that, basically, the neoidealist attack on neorealism fails: the foreign aid regime accords 
with a neorealist theory of international politics. Neorealists should presumably grant that neoidealists have 
a unique point in showing the independent and enduring impact of moral factors on aid. Yet neorealists 
may insist that aid by no means refutes their theory but rather confirms it. The aid regime may well be 
regarded as the outcome of domestic cosmopolitan-moral forces tamed by interstate security-related, 
egoistic constraints - hence its rather undemanding, typically conservative nature. Insofar as aid is 
valuable for its contribution to poverty reduction and recipient economic development, we might endorse 
the immediate prescriptive implication of neoidealism: all rich countries, including the United States, should 
provide aid (even) more generously, and therefore transform themselves further in social democratic 
direction (cf. Lumsdaine 1993: 283-293). A neoidealist success in this respect is not something neorealism 
could, or would, exclude. However, given the moral nature of the aid regime, neorealists have good reason 
to maintain that aid does not entail a basic change of the international system, but embodies the will to do 
good without ever endangering donor state security. Foreign aid, insofar as it is successful 
(which is not self-evident; Easterly 2006), is best seen as a serious contribution to a friendlier international 
system. 
Yet while the aid regime as an international practice rooted in moral factors does not imply the 
abandonment of neorealism, it does suggest that neorealism be refined. The aid regime suggests a 
neorealist theory that is not just not extreme in explaining all state behavior directly on the basis of 
security-related factors, but is also closer to neoidealism than most neorealist theories based on the four 
core propositions employed above presumably will be. After all, second image cosmopolitanism does seep 
through state boundaries into the international system. The result would be a ‘mixed neorealist' theory that 
assigns clear priority to national security because of non-transformed system constraints yet also expects 
states, if once secure, to show altruistic instead of further egoistic behavior, depending on the nature and 
development of their domestic moral-political systems. Such a theory, I would provisionally contend at the 
end of this article, may well have more explanatory power than Alexander Wendt's (1999) ‘constructivist 
neorealism', which utopianistically assumes states under anarchy and its systemic pressures to be capable 
of transcending primary egoism in favor of a deep altruism including collective identity and to move up to 
a ‘Kantian culture' of ‘friendship' world-wide rather than merely Europe-wide. 
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Notes
[1] It should be emphasized that I offer no direct (empirical) defense of neorealism's core propositions 
here. Rather, my defense is indirect: for all the immediate moral impulses behind it, the foreign aid regime 
does not refute neorealism as neoidealists believe, but supports its dominant international-theoretical 
status.
[2] Methodologically, Lumsdaine (1993: 60-62, 270) rightly suggests the analytic unhelpfulness of 
understanding recipient-oriented aid behavior in terms of national (self)interest. If national (self)interest 
included both actions directed at tangible (military and economic) benefits for the state itself and actions 
primarily directed at the benefit of others or pursued from a sense of duty, it would seem tautological. 
Also, to conclude that a state shows self-interested behavior when it seeks international influence or 
prestige by pursuing a generous aid policy is too quick: if this state wants recognition by promoting 
economic development abroad as an end in itself, its behavior of giving money away is not meaningfully 
conceived as self-interested. 
[3] By 2000 about 90 percent of all bilateral aid from the 22 member states of the Development Assistance 
Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was in grants; 10 
members gave their aid entirely in grants (Hattori 2003: 243).
[4] French aid has traditionally promoted the donor's cultural and economic interests through the 
maintenance of a regional sphere of influence, attempting to reassert France's historical position as a global 
power. Hence it has been concentrated on former colonies (cf. also Noël and Thérien 2002: 648). Yet, while 
acknowledging this, Lumsdaine (1993: 85-86, 126, 164-165) also shows that Mitterand's socialist 
government turned around a long-term decline of aid to a substantially higher level with a much greater 
poverty focus.
[5] The authors borrow a typology of ‘socialist', ‘liberal' and ‘conservative' welfare state attributes from 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen's (1990) path-breaking work. They assume that the country scores for socialist 
attributes stayed the same in 1991 (their second mark year) as these were in 1980, the year for which 
Esping-Andersen had compiled his scores, insisting that potential changes must not be overestimated: as 
institutions change slowly at most, Esping-Andersen's original scores seem fairly constant indicators of 
welfare state institutions over time (Thérien and Noël 2000: 154-155; Noël and Thérien 2002: 640). 
Indeed, as welfare states have proved to be very resilient in the light of economic globalization and 
European integration, one may speak of a ‘"frozen" welfare state landscape' (Esping-Andersen 1996: 
quotation 24).
[6] One might object that by providing much aid to poor countries small states may try to gain 
international status and support in international organizations, so that a directly neorealist perspective on 
small states could also explain it. However, first, it is doubtful whether giving money away to poor 
countries would really lead to a significant increase of small states' power or influence in a security-related 
sense, and more so than spending this money for developing high tech industry, a stronger army, a 
shipping industry, or scientific or cultural distinction (cf. Lumsdaine 1993: 60). Indeed, insofar as these 
international organizations have it, the power, or ‘authority', of  the World Bank and the United Nations 
seems better understood in normative, even moral, terms than in material ones (cf. Finnemore 1996: 
89-127; Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Second, such a directly neorealist explanation would, implausibly, 
either have to deal with the (clearly established) socialism-foreign aid correlation as an unimportant 
coincidence, or have to explain this correlation on the basis that small states, and only such states, tend to 
be social democratic because of international system pressures. In short, it seems more plausible to hold 
that by generous aid provision these small countries seek an international voice mainly because of moral 
reasons.
[7] Norway (which has an almost pure ‘socialist' welfare state), Sweden (which indeed has a purely
‘socialist' welfare state), and Denmark have strong Left traditions and firmly established socialist welfare 
attributes. Dutch governance has mostly been dominated by centrist Christian democracy, but that has 
remarkably pursued a generous social democratic politics and thus created strong socialist welfare 
institutions in an attempt to stay in power against the Left (which further expanded the welfare state when 
it came to power in the 1970s) (Thérien and Noël 2000: 157, 159-160; Cox 1993: 168-169, 218-219). In 
the United Kingdom, the Left has been able to exercise much cumulative power through diverse Labor 
governments, but the welfare state still has more liberal than socialist attributes because of British 
traditional individualism (cf. Breuning 1995). The French welfare state scores ‘low-socialist', but French 
politics has given a prominent place to the republican notion of social solidarity, with consequent reforms 
along social democratic lines, so that eventually the French welfare state is familiar to ‘mid-socialist' ones. 
In Germany, Christian democracy is even more strongly present than the Left, but, unlike in the 
Netherlands, here no situation exists of a center party pursuing social reforms under pressure from the 
Left. In Japan and the United States, the Left and socialist attributes have had very little chance to develop.
[8] It remains to be seen, however, whether foreign aid really is a type of redistribution. See the next 
section.
[9] The EU's prolonged agricultural support comes to mind. Of total EU expenditure, about 50 percent is 
allocated to the common agricultural policy. Arguably, both the EU and the United States contribute to 
pauperization of farmers globally, but the former causes the greatest damage (Radelet 2003: 116). Note 
also the wide gap between the EU's rhetorical commitment to international climate policy and its actual 
behavior of increasing carbon dioxide emission - indeed, a gap wider than that in case of the United States.
[10] One might think this conclusion is too quick. Perhaps neoidealists may shift to a communitarian 
rather 
than cosmopolitan second image explanation of aid. Thus, they might explain aid by pointing out that 
people within Western countries apparently endorse a principle of priority for compatriots in the 
distribution of material goods, and believe their obligations to foreigners to be significant yet more limited 
(cf. Walzer 1983; Miller 1995). In this way, neoidealism might uphold the overall explanatory role of moral 
factors in aid, explaining the progressive/conservative discontinuity itself. However, this escape strategy 
from neoidealism's original, more cosmopolitan assumptions and their drawbacks may not work. First, it 
contradicts the non-nationalist evidence neoidealists themselves offer. Second, European public culture 
being cosmopolitan rather than nationalist seems not that surprising, as for a socialist facing an 
asymmetrical capitalist world economy of ever increasing inequalities the concern for global fairness should 
overrule the potentially deep significance of the national community. Third, if neoidealism now could prove 
European aid to result from societies upholding a nationalist, ‘two-level' version of socialism actually 
inconsistent with the original doctrine (like our neoidealists I shall not assume this to be the case, yet I 
consider it here for the sake of argument), its explanatory success would have a high price: the loss of its 
morally transformative appeal. Indeed, a communitarian aid explanation would fit well within a neorealist 
worldview: nations need state power if they wish to give firmness and consistency to their members' 
interests and obligations, and this entails the existence of a third image environment that may have causal 
significance for state behavior (Waltz 1959: 184). Neorealism might not help to explain aid under this 
hypothetical circumstance, but my thesis that the aid regime is strongly consistent with neorealism would 
then still hold. 
[11] It is thus also wrong to assume that neorealism must predict aid to decline with the end of the Cold 
War (contra Hattori 2001: 649) or to be continuously tied as a vehicle to influence recipient countries.
[12] From a neorealist perspective, it is no surprise that Lumsdaine can find ‘an inverse relation between 
support for aid and concern about strengthening military defense' for ‘all Europe' (Lumsdaine 1993: 143, 
based on the 1983 Euro-Barometer study). Indeed, no-longer truly great powers such as the United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany, and also the Netherlands, spend relatively little for defense, having little 
incentive to spend more. 
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